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A theory of tacit collusion is developed based on coordination through price
leadership and less than full mutual understanding of strategies. It is common
knowledge that price increases are to be at least matched but who should lead
and at what price is not common knowledge. The steady-state price is charac-
terized and it falls short of the best collusive equilibrium price. Coordination
through tacit means, rather than express communication, is then shown to
constrain the extent of the price rise from collusion.
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11 Introduction
The economic theory of collusion focuses on what outcomes are sustainable and the
strategy proﬁles that sustain them: What prices and market allocations can be sup-
ported? What are the most eﬀective strategies for monitoring compliance? What
are the most severe punishments that can be imposed in response to evidence of
non-compliance? The literature is rich in taking account of the determinants of the
set of collusive outcomes including market traits such as product diﬀerentiation and
demand volatility, ﬁrm traits such as capacity, cost, and time preference, and the
amount of public and private information available to ﬁrms.
In comparison, the primary focus of antitrust law is not on the outcome nor
the strategies that sustain an outcome but rather the means by which a collusive
arrangement is achieved. The illegality comes from ﬁrms having an agreement to
coordinate their behavior.
[A]ntitrust law clariﬁed that the idea of an agreement describes a
process that ﬁrms engage in, not merely the outcome that they reach.
Not every parallel pricing outcome constitutes an agreement because not
every such outcome was reached through the process to which the law
objects: a negotiation that concludes when the ﬁrms convey mutual as-
surances that the understanding they reached will be carried out.1
To establish the presence of an agreement - and thereby a violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act - it must be shown that ﬁrms "had a conscious commitment to a
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective,"2 that they had a "unity
of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds."3 Thus, the
law focuses on what mutual understanding exists among ﬁrms and how that mutual
understanding was achieved.4
From this perspective, U.S. antitrust law has identiﬁed three types of collusion.
Explicit collusion is when supracompetitive prices are achieved via express communi-
cation about an agreement; there has been a direct exchange of assurances regarding
the coordination of their conduct. Mutual understanding is signiﬁcant and is acquired
through express communication. Explicit collusion is illegal. Conscious parallelism is
when supracompetitive prices are achieved without express communication. A com-
mon example is two adjacent gasoline stations in which one station raises its price to a
supracompetitive level and the other station matches the price hike. While there may
be mutual understanding regarding the underlying mechanism that stabilizes those
supracompetitive prices (for example, any price undercutting results in a return to
1Baker (1993), p. 179.
2Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); 753.
3American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); 810.
4The distinction between the economic and legal approaches to collusion is presented in Kaplow
and Shapiro (2007); also, see Kaplow (2011a, 2011b, 2011c).
2competitive prices), this understanding was not reached through express communi-
cation. Conscious parallelism is legal.5 Concerted action resides between these two
extremes and refers to when supracompetitive prices are achieved with some form of
direct communication - such as about intentions - but ﬁrms do not expressly propose
and reach an agreement (Page 2007).6 For example, concerted practices may involve
a ﬁrm’s public announcement of a proposed pricing policy which, without the express
aﬃrmative response from its rivals, is followed by the common adoption of that policy
with a subsequent rise in price. The extent of mutual understanding is more than
conscious parallelism but does not reach the level of explicit collusion. Concerted
action lies in the gray area of what is legal and what is not. Conscious parallelism
and concerted action are both forms of tacit collusion in that a substantive part of
the collusive arrangement is achieved without express communication.
While the distinction between explicit and tacit collusion exists in practice and in
t h el a w ,i ti sad i s t i n c t i o nt h a ti sl a r g e l ya b s e n tf r o me c o n o m i ct h e o r y . 7 The economic
theory of collusion - based on equilibrium analysis - presumes mutual understanding
is complete (that is, the strategy proﬁle is common knowledge) and does not deal with
how mutual understanding is achieved, nor the extent of coordinated behavior that
c a nr e s u l tw h e nt h e r ea r eg a p si nm u t u a lu nderstanding. Furthermore, there is good
reason for ﬁrms to try to collude without express communication, and thus ﬁnd them-
selves dealing with less than full mutual understanding. Given that explicit collusion
is illegal and tacit collusion often escapes conviction, if ﬁrms can achieve a collusive
outcome through tacit means then they will presumably do so and thereby avoid the
possibility of ﬁnancial penalties and jail time. This then leads one to ask: What types
of markets are conducive to tacit collusion? What types of public announcements are
able to generate suﬃcient mutual understanding to produce collusion? In markets for
5Conscious parallelism "refers to a form of tacit collusion in which each ﬁrm in an oligopoly
realizes that it is within the interests of the entire group of ﬁrms to maintain a high price or to avoid
vigorous price competition, and the ﬁrms act in accordance with this realization." (Hylton, 2003, p.
73)
6From Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 226 (1939): "It was enough that,
knowing that concerted action was contemplated or invited, the distributors gave their adherence to
the scheme and participated in it. ... [A]cceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of
an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint
of interstate commerce, is suﬃcient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act."
7Rightfully and frequently, lawyers remind economists of our inadequacy in this regard:
While properly applied economic science may allow an economist to reach conclu-
sions about "collusion," the term as used by economists may include both tacit and
overt collusion among competitors ... and it is unclear whether economists have any
special expertise to distinguish between the kinds of "agreement." [Milne and Pace
(2003), p. 36]
On the ultimate issue of whether behavior is the result of a contract, combination,
or conspiracy, however, courts routinely prevent economists from oﬀering an opinion,
because economics has surprisingly little to say about this issue. [Page (2007), p. 424]
3which both explicit and tacit collusion are feasible, when is collusion through explicit
means signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable? To address those questions requires developing
distinct theories of explicit collusion and tacit collusion. Of course, the primary chal-
lenge to modelling tacit collusion is dispensing with the assumption of equilibrium
and allowing for less than full mutual understanding among ﬁrms.8
The contribution of this paper is in developing a theory of tacit collusion. Two
essential elements of a model of tacit collusion are: 1) a transparent mechanism for
coordinating on a collusive outcome; and 2) a plausible amount of mutual understand-
ing among ﬁrms. The coordination mechanism considered here is price leadership,
which is a commonly observed method of tacit collusion.9 In terms of mutual under-
standing, it is assumed that it is common knowledge among ﬁrms that price increases
will be at least matched and that failure to do so results in reversion to the pre-
collusive outcome.10 What is not common knowledge is leadership protocol. Which
ﬁrm will lead by raising price? What price will it set? Is another ﬁrm expected to
lead the next round of price hikes? In other words, there is mutual understanding
among ﬁrms about the general mechanism of price leadership and price matching,
but ﬁr m sm a yl a c kc o m m o nb e l i e f sr e g a r d i n gt h es p e c i ﬁc sequence of prices. Another
way to view this assumption on mutual understanding is that, rather than suppose
as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is common knowledge as is done with an equilibrium analysis, it is
instead assumed to be common knowledge that ﬁrms’ strategies lie in a subset of the
strategy space. I will argue that this assumption on mutual understanding is plausi-
bly achieved without express communication of the variety that would be a Section
1v i o l a t i o n .
Without the equilibrium assumption, two questions are of particular interest.
First, can we characterize ﬁrms’ prices when they lack mutual understanding as to
their strategies? More broadly, how much mutual understanding is required to say
something precise? Second, assuming we can say something precise, what is the
8One should not be misled to believe that the theoretical industrial organization literature is
replete with theories of tacit collusion by virtue of use of the expression, as exempliﬁed by the
excellent survey "The Economics of Tacit Collusion" (Ivaldi et al, 2003). These theories characterize
collusive behavior assuming full mutual understanding of strategies (that is, equilibrium) and are
agnostic regarding how mutual understanding is reached. There is, however, some research that is
most naturally considered explicit collusion because it assumes ﬁrms expressly communicate within
the context of an equilibrium. Cheap talk messages about ﬁrms’ private information on cost are
exchanged in Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008), on demand in Aoyagi (2002), Hanazono and Yang
(2007), and Gerlach (2009), and on sales in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011). There is also a body
of work on bidding rings in auctions where participation in the auction is preceded by a mechanism
among the ring members that involves the exchange of reported valuations; see, for example, Graham
and Marshall (1987) and Krishna (2010).
9See Markham (1951) for an early discussion of price leadership and collusion, and Scherer (1980,
Chapter 6) for several examples. In the equilibrium setting, some relevant papers exploring price
leadership as a collusive device include Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) and Mouraviev and Rey
(2011).
10The role of price-matching here is to coordinate on a collusive outcome. It has also been explored
as a form of punishment; see Lu and Wright (2010) and Garrod (2011).
4cost to ﬁrms from not having full mutual understanding? Is price lower under tacit
collusion than if they were to engage in express communication and achieve the mutual
understanding of strategies implicit in equilibrium?
In answer to the ﬁrst question, I show that a precise statement can be made as to
the steady-state price, though the transition path eludes characterization. As regards
the second question, the lack of full mutual understanding does indeed constrain the
extent of collusion; the steady-state price is strictly below the highest sustainable
equilibrium price. In other words, if ﬁrms could expressly communicate, they would
sustain a price in excess of that which is achieved under tacit collusion.
To my knowledge, the only other theory of tacit collusion is MacLeod (1985),
whose approach is very diﬀerent. To begin, it is based on ﬁrms announcing proposed
price changes rather than making actual price changes. Axioms specify how ﬁrms
respond to a price announcement, and these axioms are common knowledge. A ﬁrm’s
price response is allowed to depend on the existing price vector and the announced
price change, and it is assumed the ﬁrm which announces the price change will im-
plement it. If it is assumed that the price response is continuous with respect to the
announcement, invariant to scale changes, and independent of ﬁrm identity then the
response function must entail matching the announced price change.11 When ﬁrms
are symmetric, the theory predicts that the joint proﬁtm a x i m u mi sa c h i e v e d . T o
t h ec o n t r a r y ,t h et h e o r yd e v e l o p e dh e r ep r e d i c t sp r i c ei sa l w a y sb e l o wt h ep r i c et h a t
maximizes joint proﬁt.
Of some relevance to the current paper is the literature on the rational learning of
strategies in a repeated game; see, for example, Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Nachbar
(2005). The main result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is that if players are rational and
each starts with a set of beliefs on other players’ strategies that are compatible with
the strategies actually chosen then play must converge in ﬁnite time to an −Nash
equilibrium of the repeated game, for arbitrarily small . Assumptions are very weak
in that a player need not know other players’ payoﬀs or whether they are rational.
In contrast, it is assumed here that rationality and payoﬀ functions are common
knowledge. While both that literature and the current paper explore behavior in a
repeated game setting when strategies are not common knowledge, their objectives
are very diﬀerent. The rational learning literature seeks to determine how weak one
can make the assumptions on beliefs in an inﬁnitely repeated setting and still achieve
convergence on an equilibrium. The current paper’s goal is to develop a theory of
tacit collusion; that is, making predictions on price based on plausible assumptions
on mutual understanding. Given these distinct goals, the amount of structure placed
on prior beliefs is very diﬀerent. The rational learning literature only requires that
a player’s prior beliefs on the other players’ strategies include their actual strategies
11If it was not assumed to be common knowledge that the ﬁrm announcing the price change would
implement it then another price response function which satisﬁes the axioms is one which has a zero
price response. In fact, it should be stated as a fourth axiom that the price change of the ﬁrm
announcing the price change equals that announcement.
5in the support. The paper here draws from the context of tacit collusion in a market
to place a substantive, though plausible, amount of structure on prior beliefs, and
then derive its implications for prices. The results are more precise but then the
assumptions are stronger.12
The model is described in Section 2 - where standard assumptions are made
regarding cost, demand, and ﬁrm objectives - and in Section 3 - where the assumption
of equilibrium is replaced with alternative assumptions on the behavior and beliefs of
ﬁrms. An upper bound on price under tacit collusion is derived in Section 4 which,
by way of example, is shown in Section 5 cannot generally be improved upon. A
modest additional assumption is made in Section 6 to precisely predict the long-run
price produced by tacit collusion. Results are extended to when ﬁrms have diﬀerent
discount factors in Section 7. For the case of linear demand and cost functions,
Section 8 explores the price eﬀect of ﬁrms coordinating their behavior through tacit,
rather than explicit, means. Section 9 oﬀers a few concluding remarks.
2 Assumptions on the Market
Consider a symmetric diﬀerentiated products price game with  ﬁrms. (p−):
<
+ → < is a ﬁrm ’s proﬁtw h e ni tp r i c e sa t and its rivals price at p− =
(1−1 +1) Assume (p−) is bounded, twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, increasing in a rival’s price  ( 6= ), and strictly concave in own price  A
ﬁrm’s best reply function then exists:






 0 ∀ 6= 
from which it follows that (p−) is increasing in 6= . A symmetric Nash
equilibrium price,  exists and is assumed to be unique,










12In a related spirit, Wolitsky (2011) derives a lower bound on a player’s payoﬀ in an inﬁnite
horizon bargaining setting when player  knows: 1) player  is rational; and 2) player  knows that
player  is committed to a particular strategy (referred to as a "posture") with probability  When
the player’s posture is chosen strategically, the lower bound on a player’s payoﬀ is characterized and
is shown to be large relative to .






T 0 as  S 

and   
F i r m si n t e r a c ti na ni n ﬁnitely repeated price game with perfect monitoring. A

















where  is the common discount factor.14 Deﬁne e  as the best price sustainable using
the grim trigger strategy:











































e  will prove to be a useful benchmark.
For the later analysis, consider the "price matching" objective function for a ﬁrm:






Given its rivals price at p− in the current period,  (p−) is ﬁrm ’s payoﬀ from
















If    then the second term is positive; by raising its current price, a ﬁrm
increases the future proﬁt stream under the assumption that its price increase will
be matched by its rivals. If  (−) then the ﬁrst term is negative. Evaluate
(−)



























13The grim trigger strategy has any deviation from the collusive price 0 result in a price of 
forever.
14Section 7 shows that results are robust to when ﬁrms have diﬀerent discount factors.
7Thus, when  ∈
¡
 ¢
 raising price lowering current proﬁt,
()





  0. By the preceding assumptions,  (p−)
is strictly concave in  since it is the weighted sum of two strictly concave functions.




(p−) is referred to as the price matching best reply function for a ﬁrm. By the




















As there is a beneﬁt in terms of future proﬁt from raising price (as long as it does not
exceed the joint proﬁt maximum) then the price matching best reply function results























which is positive because p− ≤
¡
¢
implies (p−)  .15 By the strict
concavity of , (p−) (p−)




















Further assume the ﬁxed point is unique:
() T  as  S 
∗
Thus, if rival ﬁrms price at ∗,aﬁrm prefers to price at ∗ rather than price diﬀerently
under the assumption that its price will be matched forever. ∗ will prove to be a
useful benchmark.
Results are proven when the price set is ﬁnite.16 From hereon, assume the price
set is ∆ ≡ {02} where 0 and is presumed to be small. For convenience,
15Since () T  as  S  then 
¡
 ¢








16A discussion of the case of an inﬁnite price set is provided at the end of Section 4.
8suppose  ∗ e  ∈ ∆.17 As the ﬁniteness of the price set could generate multi-
ple optima, deﬁne the best reply correspondence for the price matching objective
function:













⊆ {0 + ∗} if p− =( 00) where 0  ∗ − 
= {∗} if p− =( ∗
∗
)
⊆ {∗0 − } if p− =( 00) where 0  ∗ + 
(4)
Recall that ∗ is the unique ﬁxed point for (p−) and is also a ﬁxed point for (p−).
By (4), if all rival ﬁrms price at 0 then ﬁrm ’s best reply has it price above 0 when
0  ∗ −  Analogously, if 0  ∗ +  then ﬁrm ’s best reply has it price below 0.
Note that an implication of (4) is that the set of symmetric ﬁxed points of (p−) is,
at most, {∗ − ∗ ∗ + }.
The example case of linear demand and cost functions in Section 8 satisﬁes all of
the assumptions made in Section 2.
3 Assumptions on Beliefs and Behavior
The equilibrium approach to characterizing ﬁrm pricing entails making assumptions
on behavior - each ﬁrm acts to maximize its payoﬀ given the conjectured strategies
of the other ﬁrms - and beliefs - each ﬁrm’s conjectures are accurate. The standard
behavioral assumption is retained by assuming ﬁrms are rational, ﬁrms believe other
ﬁrms are rational, and so forth.
Assumption A1: A ﬁrm is rational in the sense of choosing a strategy to maximize
the present value of its expected proﬁt stream given its beliefs on other ﬁrms’
strategies, and rationality is common knowledge.
As the focus here is on tacit collusion - in which case ﬁrms do not engage in express
communication - assuming ﬁrms have accurate beliefs as to their rivals’ strategies is
problematic, especially in light of the abundance of collusive equilibria. The approach
taken here is to weaken the equilibrium assumption that the strategy proﬁle is com-
mon knowledge by instead assuming that only some properties of ﬁrms’ strategies
are common knowledge. Alternatively stated, it is common knowledge that ﬁrms’
strategies lie in a subset of the strategy space; equilibrium is when the subset is a
singleton.
17If e  ∈ ∆ and (e  e ) ∈ ∆ then e  is still the best price sustainable using the grim punishment.
18It is shown in Appendix A that a suﬃcient condition for (4) is −2
2
 ≥ 2 2
−,w h i c hh o l d s
when demand and cost functions are linear.
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∀∀ ≤  − 1
First note that matching a price increase means setting 

















∀∀ ≤  − 1. The PMP property has ﬁrms only price as
high as e , where recall that e  is the highest equilibrium price using the grim pun-













∀∀ ≤  − 1. In that event, the PMP property








of not pricing in excess of e  Finally, if any ﬁrm should fail to act in a manner con-
sistent with this price matching behavior then a ﬁrm will revert to pricing at the
non-collusive price  thereafter. A strategy satisfying the PMP property will be
referred to as being PMP-compatible.
Assumption A2: It is common knowledge that a ﬁrm’s strategy satisﬁes the price
matching plus property.
By A2, there is a "meeting of the minds" among ﬁrms that: 1) price increases are
at least matched as long as past price increases have been at least matched in the past;
2) price increases will be followed only as high as e ; and 3) departure from this price
matching behavior results in reversion to non-collusive pricing. I now want to argue
how mutual understanding among ﬁrms that their strategies have these properties
could plausibly be achieved without express communication of the sort associated
with explicit collusion. Each of the three properties will be taken in turn.
Let us start by examining how it could become common knowledge that price
increases will at least be matched. First, it could occur through unilateral public
announcements whereby one ﬁrm’s manager declares elements of a strategy that en-
compasses price leadership and price matching. For example, in the one-way truck
rental market, the FTC claimed that, during a public announcement regarding earn-
ings, the CEO of U-Haul repeatedly emphasized that U-Haul was demonstrating
"price leadership" and was "trying to force prices."19 Second, mutual understanding
could be achieved by the adoption of actions that served to communicate an expec-
tation among ﬁrms that they will engage in coordinated pricing. It is argued in
19Matter of U-Haul Int’l Inc. and AMERCO (FTC File No. 081-0157, July 10, 2010).
10Harrington (2011) that, under certain market conditions, the mutual adoption of the
posted price format signals that ﬁrms expect to collude. In the case of the turbine
generator market, General Electric and Westinghouse mutually adopted the posted
price format and subsequently engaged in tacit collusion through price leadership
and price matching; there was no evidence of any express communication.20 Thus,
by taking certain costly actions that would only be optimal if ﬁrms did engage in
tacit collusion, a common expectation of price matching was achieved. Third, mu-
tual understanding of price matching could be acquired by way of example. One ﬁrm
could raise its price and if rivals subsequently matched that price then ﬁrms may
then have mutual understanding regarding price matching; from that point onward,
Assumption A2 could well hold. This is a view that has been expressed by Richard
Posner, ﬁrst as a scholar and then as a judge in the High Fructose Corn Syrup case:
[O]ne seller communicates his "oﬀer" by restricting output, and the
oﬀer is "accepted" by the actions of this rivals in restricting their outputs
as well. It may therefore be appropriate in some cases to instruct a jury
to ﬁnd an agreement to ﬁxp r i c e si fi ti ss a t i s ﬁed that there was a tacit
meeting of the minds of the defendants on maintaining a noncompetitive
pricing policy.21
If a ﬁrm raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do like-
wise, and they do, the ﬁrm’s behavior can be conceptualized as the oﬀer
of a unilateral contract that the oﬀerees accept by raising their prices.22
In summary, there are a variety of indirect forms of communication that could result
in ﬁrms having mutual understanding regarding price matching.
Next, consider the assumption that it is common knowledge that failure to at
least match price increases (up to a maximum price of e ) results in non-collusive
pricing thereafter. If, in fact, a ﬁrm acts to the contrary - by not following a price
increase or undercutting price - then observed behavior will run contrary to common
expectations. In describing how ﬁrms respond to this incongruity between beliefs and
behavior, I will draw on Lewis (1969) to argue that ﬁrms resort to an outcome that is
perceived as salient. Lewis (1969) deﬁnes a salient outcome as "one that stands out
from the rest by its uniqueness in some conspicuous respect"23 and that precedence is
one source of saliency: "We may tend to repeat the action that succeeded before if we
have no strong reason to do otherwise."24 Cubitt and Sugden (2003) stress the latter
qualiﬁer and note that "precedent allows the individual to make inductive inferences
20The posted price format has ﬁrms publicly announce a non-negotiable price. For details on the
turbine generator case, see Scherer (1980, p. 182) and Hay (2000).
21Posner (2001), pp. 94-95.
22In Re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation Appeal of A & W Bottling Inc et al,U . S .
Court of Appeals, 295 F3d 652, (7th Cir., 2002).
23Lewis, (1969), p. 35.
24Lewis, (1969), p. 37.
11in which she has some conﬁdence, but which are overridden whenever deductive
analysis points clearly in a diﬀerent direction."25
With this perspective in mind, the movement from competition to tacit collu-
sion can be seen as a shift from inductive to deductive reasoning. Firms have been
competing and, by induction, they would expect to continue to do so. However,
either through price signaling or public announcement of strategies or some other
coordinating event, ﬁrms supplant inductive inferences with deductive reasoning so
that a common expectation of competition is replaced with a common expectation
of price matching. With this as a backdrop, my claim is that a subsequent departure
in behavior from price matching implies a breakdown in the eﬃcacy of deductive
reasoning, in response to which ﬁrms revert to the original inductive analysis and
therefore the competitive solution. Here I am appealing to the view that ﬁrms will
"tend to pick the salient as a last resort."26 The saliency of the competitive solution
emanates from it being the most recent outcome (prior to the current episode of tacit
collusion) that was common knowledge to ﬁrms.27
There are two implicit assumptions in the preceding argument that warrant dis-
cussion. First, the saliency of the competitive solution relies on it prevailing prior
to this episode of tacit collusion. However, that is not essential for the paper’s main
results. If some other behavior described the pre-collusion setting then that behavior
can be assumed instead. What is critical is that how ﬁrms respond to the departure
from price matching is common knowledge and the associated continuation payoﬀ is
lower than if ﬁr m sh a da b i d e db yt h eP M Pp r o p e r t y . 28 A second assumption, which
ﬁgures prominently in discussions of saliency (such as in Lewis, 1969), is that the
current post-collusion situation is suﬃciently similar to the pre-collusion situation so
that induction on the latter is compelling. It is well-recognized that
no two interactions are exactly alike. Any two real-world interactions
will diﬀer in matters of detail, quite apart from the inescapable fact that
"previous" and "current" interactions occur at diﬀerent points in time.
Thus, the idea of "repeating what was done in previous instances of the
game" is not well-deﬁned. Precedent has to depend on analogy: to follow
precedent in the presence instance is to behave in a way that is analogous
with behaviour in past instances. ... Inductive inference is possible only
because a very small subset of the set of possible patterns is privileged.29
25Cubitt and Sugden (2003), p. 196. Also see Sugden (2011).
26Lewis, (1969), p. 35.
27If two people are physically separated and in search of each other, a salient place for them to
meet is the last place that they were together. That place is common knowledge to them - as they
both witnessed each other there - and it is singular in being the most recent place visited that is
common knowledge. Analogously, if there is inconsistency in ﬁrm behavior, ﬁrms may return to the
most recent strategy proﬁle that was common knowledge.
28While the reversion to some non-collusive outcome is motivated by its saliency, it will serve the
usual role as a punishment in response to non-compliant behavior.
29Cubitt and Sugden (2003), pp. 196-7.
12The post-collusion scenario most notably diﬀers from the pre-collusion scenario in that
the former was preceded by an episode of collusion, while the latter was (probably)
not. Though this diﬀerence could disrupt the saliency of the pre-collusion outcome
when it comes to responding to a departure from the PMP property, it is reasonable
for its saliency to remain intact which is the presumption made here.
The third and ﬁnal feature to the PMP property is that a ﬁrm will not price in
excess of e  which means that it will follow price increases only as high as e  and, as a
price leader, will not raise price beyond e . It is surely compelling for a ﬁrm to have
some upper bound to how high it will price. For the purpose of this discussion, denote
this upper bound to be  and let  replace e  in the PMP property. Next, deﬁne 
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 =  ∀∀ ≥  However, this pricing












which implies a ﬁrm does better by pricing at () and earning  thereafter
(which it can expect by A2). Hence, A1-A2 imply that  ≤ . It would also seem
reasonable to suppose that  ≤  so ﬁrms do not follow price increases beyond the
joint proﬁt maximizing price. In that case,  ≤ e 
That it is common knowledge that price increases will not be matched beyond
what is consistent with rationality ( ≤ ) is compelling, and beyond what is com-
monly recognized as most desirable ( ≤ e ) is reasonable. But A2 goes further in
specifying that  = e . One argument for this property is from a collective rationality
perspective in that following price increases all the way up to e  is best for all ﬁrms.
In fact, this property would seem quite convincing for when there are two ﬁrms. If
ﬁrm 1 raised price in the previous period to e  then it is in the interests of ﬁrm 2 to
match that price as long as it expects ﬁr m1t od os o .S i n c eﬁrm 1 was the one which
raised price to e  it has revealed a willingness to price at e  which makes such a belief
for ﬁrm 2 quite reasonable. However, such an argument does not extend to when
there are three or more ﬁrms. Even if ﬁrm 1 raised price in the previous period to e ,
ﬁrm 2 may not match that price because it is uncertain whether ﬁrm 3 will match
it, and ﬁrm 3 may not match it because it is uncertain ﬁrm 2 will match it. While
ﬁrm 1 has revealed a preference for pricing at e , ﬁrms 2 and 3 have not. Recognizing
this concern, it still seems plausible that it could be common knowledge among ﬁrms
that price increases will be matched up to e .
Let me summarize the assumptions on behavior and beliefs. In terms of behavior,
it is assumed that a ﬁrm is rational, a ﬁrm will (at least) match a rival’s price as
long as price does not exceed the highest sustainable price, and a ﬁrm will revert to
competitive pricing if any ﬁrm should depart from this price matching behavior. The
restriction on beliefs is that this behavior is common knowledge. Consistent with tacit
collusion, it has been argued that this is a plausible amount of mutual understanding
13that could reasonably be achieved without the express communication associated with
explicit collusion. Furthermore, there remains signiﬁcant residual uncertainty among
ﬁr m sa b o u tt h es t r a t e g i e so ft h e i rr i v a l s .I ti sn o tc o m m o nk n o w l e d g ea st ow h ow i l l
lead a price increase, when it will occur, what price a leader will set, and whether
price increases will just be matched or instead exceeded.
In Section 4, it is shown that these assumptions are suﬃcient to place a non-trivial
upper bound on price. Section 5 provides an example to show that more structure
i sr e q u i r e dt ot i g h t e nt h eb o u n do np r i c i n g . I nS e c t i o n6 ,s o m em i n i m a la d d i t i o n a l
structure on beliefs is added to precisely characterize the steady-state price under
tacit collusion.
4 An Upper Bound on Price under Tacit Collusion
To begin the analysis, it is essential to show that Assumptions A1 and A2 are com-
patible in the sense that a ﬁrm’s best reply is a PMP-compatible strategy when it
believes its rivals use PMP-compatible strategies. After showing that a rational ﬁrm
uses a PMP-compatible strategy, Theorem 2 presents the main result of this section
which is to oﬀer an upper bound on price under tacit collusion. Theorem 3 shows
that this upper bound is strictly below the best equilibrium price.
Deﬁne  as the subset of a ﬁrm’s strategy space that satisﬁes the PMP
property. Theorem 2 shows that if ﬁrm ’s beliefs over other ﬁrms’ strategies have
support in  then ﬁrm ’s best reply must lie in ;t h a ti s ,t h es e t is
closed under the best reply operator. All proofs are in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 Assume max{0
10
} ≥ .I fﬁrm ’s beliefs over other ﬁrms’ strate-
gies have support in  then, for all histories, ﬁrm ’s best reply lies in .
T h e o r e m2s h o w st h a ti fi ti sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g et h a tﬁrms are rational and that
ﬁrms use strategies satisfying the PMP property then price is bounded above by
(approximately) ∗.30










weakly increasing over time and there exists ﬁnite  such that 
1 = ··· = 
 = b 
∀ ≥  where b  ≤ ∗ + .
In explaining the basis for Theorem 2, ﬁrst note that while A2 leaves unspeciﬁed
whether some ﬁrm will initiate a price increase, it is fully consistent with A1-A2 for
a ﬁrm to be a price leader. For example, if a ﬁrm believed other ﬁrms would not
30Theorem 2 is stated for when ﬁrms are initially pricing competitively, which is the appropriate











14raise price then it would be rational for this ﬁrm to increase price (as long as the
current price is not too high). The issue is how far would it go in raising price. If
the ﬁrm expected that its price increase would only be met and never exceeded by
a rival (for example, rivals are believed to only match price increases) then it would
n o tw a n tt or a i s ep r i c ea b o v e( a p p r o x i m a t e l y )∗.31 Recall that ∗ is the price at
which a ﬁrm, if it were to raise price from ∗ to any higher level (call it 0)t h e ni t
would lose more in current proﬁt (because of lower demand from pricing above the
level ∗ set by its rivals) than it would gain in future proﬁt (from all ﬁrms pricing at
0). Thus, a ﬁrm that believed its rivals would never initiate price increases would
not raise price beyond ∗.H o w e v e r ,aﬁrm might be willing to lead a price increase
above ∗ if it believed it would induce a rival to further increase price; for example,
if the ﬁrm believed that ﬁrms would take turns leading price increases. The essence
of the proof of Theorem 2 is showing that cannot happen.
To begin, a ﬁrm will never price above e , which is the minimum of the highest
sustainable price and the joint proﬁtm a x i m u m .I fe  ∗ then it furthermore means
that a ﬁrm would never raise price to e  since such a price increase would only induce
its rivals to match that price; it would not induce them to further raise price. Thus,
if a ﬁrm is rational and it believes the other ﬁrms use PMP-compatible strategies
then it will not raise price to e . This puts an upper bound on price of e  − .W e
next build on that result to argue that e −2 is an upper bound on price. Given it is
common knowledge that ﬁrms are rational and ﬁrms use PMP-compatible strategies,
ﬁrm  then believes ﬁrm  (6= ) is rational and also that ﬁrm  believes ﬁrm  uses
a PMP-compatible strategy (for all  6= ); hence, ﬁrm  knows that ﬁrm  will not
raise price to e . This means that ﬁrm  k n o w st h a ti fi tr a i s e sp r i c et oe  −  that
this price increase will only be matched and not exceeded, which then makes a price
increase to e  −  unproﬁtable (as long as e  −  ∗). Given that all ﬁrms are not
willing to raise price to e  −  then e  − 2 is an upper bound on price. The proof is
completed by induction - with each step using another layer of common knowledge
i nA 1a n dA 2-t oe n du pw i t ht h ec o n c l u s i o nt h a taﬁrm would never raise price to
a level exceeding ∗ + . Hence, price is bounded above by (approximately) ∗.
In deriving this upper bound, the punishment for deviation from (at least) match-
ing price is reversion to a stage game Nash equilibrium. Such a punishment could, in
principle, sustain a price as high as e . The next result shows that tacit collusion fall
short because the upper bound on price under tacit collusion is strictly less than the
highest sustainable equilibrium price.





Recall that ∗ is the price at which the reduction in current proﬁt from a marginal
increase in a ﬁrm’s price is exactly equal in magnitude to the rise in the present value
31In discussing results, I will generally refer to the upper bound as ∗ rather than ∗ +  since 
is presumed to be small.
15of the future proﬁt stream when that higher price is matched by all ﬁrms for the
inﬁnite future. Equivalently, ∗ is the price at which the increase in current proﬁt
from a marginal decrease in price to ∗ −  is exactly equal in magnitude to the fall
in the present value of the future proﬁts t r e a mwhen the ﬁrm’s rivals lower price to
∗− (when  is small). In comparison, e  is the price for a ﬁrm at which the increase
in current proﬁt from a marginal decrease in price is exactly equal in magnitude to
the fall in the present value of the future proﬁt stream when the ﬁrm’s rivals lower
price to 32 Given that the punishment is more severe in the latter case, it follows
that the maximal sustainable price is higher: e  ∗
Under tacit collusion, the steady-state price is bounded above by ∗ even though
higher prices are sustainable. In other words, if ﬁrms started at a price of e  then
such a price would persist. But if ﬁrms start with prices below ∗,s u c ha sa tt h e
non-collusive price , then prices will not go beyond ∗,e v e nt h o u g hh i g h e rp r i c e s
are sustainable. The obstacle is that it is not in the interests of any ﬁrm to lead a
price increase beyond ∗. Note that Theorems 2 and 3 are robust to the form of the
punishment. ∗ is independent of the punishment and, given another punishment, e 
would just be the highest sustainable price with that punishment. In particular, if
the punishment is at least as severe as the grim punishment then Theorems 3 and 4
are unchanged.
In concluding, let me discuss the role of the ﬁniteness of the price set. ∗ is the
highest price to which a ﬁrm will raise price if it can only anticipate that other ﬁrms
will match its price. Thus, a ﬁrm is willing to take the lead and price above ∗ only if,
by doing so, it induces a rival to enact further price increases. Since no ﬁrm will price
above e  then raising price to e  cannot induce rivals to lead future price increases.
Thus, a ﬁrm will not raise price to a level beyond e − which means e − is an upper
bound on price. This argument works iteratively to ultimately conclude that ∗ is
(approximately) an upper bound on price. The ﬁniteness of price is critical in this
proof strategy for it allows e  −  to be well-deﬁned. However, even with an inﬁnite
price set, it is still the case that a necessary condition for a ﬁrm to lead and raise price
above ∗ is that it will induce a rival to enact further price increases. As that must
always be true then, if the limit price exceeds ∗ when there is an inﬁnite price set,
price cannot converge in ﬁn i t et i m e .B u ts i n c ei ti ss t i l lt h ec a s et h a te  is an upper
bound on price, the price increases must then get arbitrarily small; eventually, each
successive price increase will bring forth a smaller future price increase by a rival.
I am not arguing that this argument will prevent Theorem 2 from extending to the
inﬁnite price set but rather that it is the only argument that could possibly do so.
In sum, either Theorem 2 extends to when the price set is inﬁnite or, if it does not,
then it implies a not very credible price path with never-ending price increases that
eventually become arbitrarily small. The oddity of such a price path would seem an
artifact of assuming an inﬁnite set of prices when, in fact, the set of prices is ﬁnite.
32That is, e  is the highest price for which a ﬁrm incentive compatibility constraint, (1), holds. For
this discussion, suppose e  .
165 Example: Price Can be Competitive or Supra-
competitive
By Theorem 2, if it is common knowledge that ﬁrms are rational and that their
strategies satisfy the PMP property then price is bounded above by ∗.B u ti s∗ the
least upper bound? And is there a lower bound on price exceeding ? The purpose
of the current section is to show, by way of example, that it is consistent with A1-A2
for price to converge to ∗ and also fail to rise above Thus, a tighter result than
Theorem 2 will require additional assumptions, which is the objective of the next
section.
For the duopoly case, suppose the price set is composed of just three elements, ©
 0 ª
 and 0 ≡
¡
 + ¢
2 Assume  is suﬃciently close to one which has
the implication: ∗ = e  = 33 Consider the following pair of functions which map





























 (where  denotes "leader") has a ﬁrm raise price to 0 when the lagged maximum
price is ,t o when the lagged maximum price is 0 and price at  when the
lagged maximum price is .  (where  denotes "follower") has a ﬁrm’s price
equal the lagged maximum price. When  (or )i sr e f e r r e dt oa sas t r a t e g y ,i t
i sm e a n tt h a tt h es p e c i ﬁcation in (5) applies when both ﬁrms have priced at least
as high as the previous period’s maximum price in all past periods, and otherwise a


























It is also shown that (6) holds for the case of linear demand and cost when products




is a subgame perfect equilibrium then it immediately follows that
both  and  are rationalizable strategies (that is, consistent with A1). Thus,









, with a steady-state price of ,i s
consistent with A1-A2. It is achieved by having ﬁrm 1 use  based upon the belief
that ﬁrm 2 use ,a n dﬁrm 2 uses  based upon the belief that ﬁrm 1 uses ;a n d






is consistent with A1-A2. It occurs when each ﬁrm uses  based
upon the belief that the other ﬁrm uses  and these beliefs are also consistent with
A1. Thus, A1-A2 could produce supracompetitive prices or competitive prices.




rather than <+. This, however, is a good approximation when  ' 1 as then
∗ '  when the price set is <+.O f c o u r s e , i f  ' 1 then e  =  whether the price set is ©
 0 ª
or <+.
176 Steady-State Price under Tacit Collusion
Thus far, assumptions have been made on a ﬁrm’s beliefs regarding price matching
-s p e c i ﬁcally, other ﬁrms will at least match price up to a maximum level of e  -a n d
regarding what happens when behavior is contrary to such price matching - other
ﬁrms will revert to competitive prices. Of some importance is that no assumptions
have been made regarding price leadership. In some markets, a particular ﬁrm may
be the salient leader by virtue of its size or access to information (what is referred
to as barometric price leadership; see, for example, Cooper, 1997). However, keep
in mind that leadership is costly in that a ﬁrm that initiates a price hike will lose
demand prior to its price being matched.34 Hence, each ﬁrm would prefer another
ﬁrm to take the lead in raising price and this could well result in a lack of common
knowledge as to who will lead - as exempliﬁed in the preceding section - as well as
the price to be set. In light of this discussion, it would seem problematic to assume
the identity of the price leader and the pattern of price increases to be common
knowledge, at least in the absence of express communication. As shown below, a
minimal and straightforward assumption about price leadership will prove suﬃcient
to show that price converges to the upper bound of ∗ identiﬁed in Theorem 2.
Deﬁne a price path to be an inﬁnite sequence of price vectors, where each vector
has  prices, one for each ﬁr m ;ap r i c ep a t hi st h e na no u t c o m et ot h eg a m e .D e ﬁne
Ω as the set of price paths consistent with A1-A2 and Ω() as the subset of Ω that
converge to  (necessarily in ﬁnite time). Ω() is composed of the price paths in
Ω() through period  − 1.D e ﬁne − () to be the set of strategy proﬁles for all
ﬁrms but  that are consistent with A1-A2 and history  and that have ﬁrms price
at  when the maximum lagged price is  (thus, they are a subset of the strategy
proﬁl e st h a tc o n v e r g et o).
Assumption A3: ∃ ﬁnite  such that if  ∈ Ω() and 
 =  ∀∀ =  − 1 −
−1 then ﬁrm  believes the other ﬁrms’ strategy proﬁle lies in − ().
By A3, if the history is consistent with other ﬁrms using strategies that converge to
 and if all ﬁrms have priced at  for a suﬃciently long time then a ﬁrm believes that
its rivals are using strategies that converge to  Note that when Ω()=∅,s ot h e r e
34Wang (2009) provides indirect evidence of the costliness of price leadership. In a retail gasoline
market in Perth, Australia, Shell was the price leader over 85% of the time until a new law increased
the cost of price leadership, after which the three large ﬁrms - BP, Caltex, and Shell - much more
evenly shared the role of price leader. The law speciﬁed that every gasoline station was to notify
the government by 2pm of its next day’s retail prices, and to post prices on its price board at the
start of the next day for a duration of at least 24 hours. Hence, a ﬁrm which led in price could
not expect its rivals to match its price until the subsequent day. The diﬀerence between price being
matched in an hour and in a day is actually quite signiﬁcant given the high elasticity of ﬁrm demand
in the retail gasoline market. For the Quebec City gasoline market, Clark and Houde (2011, p. 20)
ﬁnd that "a station that posts a price more than 2 cents above the minimum price in the city loses
between 35% and 50% of its daily volume."
18are no strategies consistent with A1-A2 that converge to , A3 is vacuous and thus
imposes no restrictions.35
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 = b  ∀ ≥ 









By A3, if prices have remained at the same level for a suﬃciently long time then a
ﬁrm believes the other ﬁrms are using strategies that converge to that price. As then
it doesn’t expect other ﬁrms to lead another price increase, if a further price increase
is in fact proﬁtable then a rational ﬁrm will enact it. As shown by the example in
the preceding section, this assumption (or something similar) is necessary to ensure
that ﬁr m sd on o te n du pi na ni n ﬁnitely long coordination failure whereby each ﬁrm
doesn’t raise price because it expects another ﬁrm to do so, in spite of an ever-growing
history to the contrary.
The main contribution of Theorem 4 is oﬀering a precise characterization of the
steady-state price under tacit collusion while making modest assumptions on ﬁrms’
behavior and beliefs. Though there is mutual understanding regarding rationality
and price matching, nothing is common knowledge concerning price leadership, and
a minimal condition is placed on a ﬁrm’s beliefs as to who will lead. It is then
possible to place restrictions on beliefs that are plausibly consistent with the absence
of express communication and still describe where tacit collusion will take price in
the long-run.
7 Generalization to Heterogeneous Discount Fac-
tors
The analysis has considered when ﬁrms are identical but results can be easily extended
to when they have diﬀerent discount factors. Letting  denote the discount factor of
ﬁrm , assume
0   ≤ −1 ≤ ···≤ 1  1
The best price sustainable using the grim trigger strategy is now deﬁned by:






















35As Theorem 4 describes the central result of the paper, I have included the condition deﬁning
∗ in the statement of the theorem to make it more self-contained.
19where ﬁrm ’s incentive compatibility constraint will be the ﬁrst to bind.36
From the "price matching" objective function for ﬁrm  of






we can deﬁne the best reply function,




 as the ﬁxed point. In contrast to the case of identical ﬁrms, ∗
 is now ﬁrm-
speciﬁca si td e p e n d so naﬁrm’s discount factor.
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Thus, more patient ﬁrms are willing to raise price to a higher level when acting as a
price leader.








=1 is weakly increasing over time and there exists ﬁnite
 such that 
1 = ···= 








1 + } if ∗
1 +  ≤ e 
∈ {∗
1 − ∗
1} if e  = ∗
1
= e  if e  ≤ ∗
1 − 

36Firms are not allowed to coordinate on a collusive outcome with unequal market shares which
is one way to improve collusion when ﬁrms have diﬀerent discount factors; see Harrington (1989)
and Obara and Zincenko (2011). This restriction would seem reasonable given that ﬁrms are tacitly
colluding in which case it isn’t clear how they would achieve mutual understanding regarding a
market allocation without engaging in express communication.
20Proof. Available on request.37
Firm  is sure to lead a price increase when: i) the current price is below ∗
;i i )
it doesn’t expect other ﬁrms to lead in price; and iii) it expects other ﬁrms would at
least match that price increase. As long as the resulting price does not exceed e  other
ﬁrms will indeed at least match the price increase. Thus, if ∗
 ≤ e  then, by A1-A3,
price will eventually reach ∗
 If ∗
1 ≤ e  then price will climb all the way to ∗
1.T h e
case of ∗
1 ≤ e  occurs when ﬁrms are not too asymmetric in their discount factors.38
In this situation, the constraint on the steady-state price is that no ﬁrm wants to be
a price leader once price reaches ∗
1.T h u s ,T h e o r e m4i su n a ﬀected if ﬁrms’ discount
factors are not too disparate. When instead ﬁrms are suﬃciently diﬀerent - so that
∗
  e  ∗
1 - the constraint on the steady-state price is instead that prices higher
than e  are not sustainable. While the more patient ﬁrms - such as ﬁrm 1 - would
be willing to raise price beyond e  if it was to be subsequently matched, the more
impatient ﬁrms - such as ﬁrm  - would prefer to undercut such a price and, as a
result, no ﬁrm raises price beyond e .
8 Linear Example: Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion
The preceding analysis has shown that tacit collusion through price leadership and
price matching results in a steady-state price of ∗. To make a comparison with
explicit collusion, let us assume that ﬁrms, if they could expressly communicate,
would agree to simultaneously raise price to the best equilibrium price of e .T h e
steady-state price diﬀerential between explicit and tacit collusion is then measured
by e −∗. This measure does implicitly assume that the same punishment is deployed
with explicit collusion as with tacit collusion which is likely not to be the case since
presumably more punishments are available to ﬁrms if they can coordinate through
express communication.39 It is then best to think of e  − ∗ as isolating the eﬀect of
the method of coordination - price leadership versus express communication - while
controlling for the mechanism that sustains the collusive outcome.
Assuming linear demand and cost functions, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is
(p−)=
Ã








( − )where  00








 +(  − )
2( − )

37The proof is very similar to the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
38Theorem 3 implies ∗
  e ,i nw h i c hc a s ei f∗
1 ' ∗
 then ∗
1  e 
39Though there is also the argument that express communication allows for re-negotiation which
can weaken punishments; see McCutcheon (1997).
21The price matching best reply function is
(p−)=





























 +(  − )
2 − (1 + )




( − ( − ))





2 ( − ( − ))
(2 − (1 + ))
3  0
It is straightforward to derive price under explicit collusion by solving (2):
e  =m i n
½
42 + 2 +4 3 + 2 − 42 − 2 − 4 +4  +3 2 − 42
62 − 122 + 3 +8 3 − 3 − 22









4( −  + )(2 − )





83 ( − ( − ))(2 − )
(4( − )+2 (1 − ))
3  0
Deﬁne 
∗ ∈ (01) by: if ()
∗ then e ()  (=)
The next result shows that e −∗ is increasing in  when  is low - so that a higher
discount factor exacerbates the cost from coordinating through price leadership - but
is decreasing in  when  is high.
Theorem 6 Assume linear demand and cost functions. Then
( −∗)
  ()0 as
()
∗
Illustrating this result for  =1  =1  = 9 =0 , Figures 1 and 2 compare
price under explicit collusion and tacit collusion, and how this comparison varies with
the discount factor. To begin, the forces determining the steady-state price depends
on the method of coordination. With tacit collusion and price leadership, a ﬁrm that
leads on price trades oﬀ lower current proﬁt - as its demand falls by raising its price
- and higher future proﬁt - as rivals subsequently match that price. With a current
loss and a future gain, a ﬁrm is more willing to engage in price leadership when its
22discount factor is higher; hence ∗ is increasing in . It is then the proﬁtability of
leading that determines the steady-state price under tacit collusion. By comparison,
explicit collusion allows ﬁrms to simultaneously raise price so there is no price leader
and thus no current loss incurred; what constrains the collusive price is sustainability
and, by the usual argument, e  is increasing in  (when e  ).40 In sum, the
steady-state price under explicit collusion is determined by the proﬁtability of not
undercutting that price, while the proﬁtability of leading a price increase is what
drives the steady-state price under tacit collusion.
When the discount factor is low, price under explicit collusion is near the compet-
itive price because only prices close to the competitive price are sustainable. Price
under tacit collusion is also near the competitive price because only for small price
increases above the competitive price is the current loss exceeded by the future gain,
and that is because the ﬁrst-order current loss is zero when all ﬁrms price at .
Hence, when the discount factor is low, the type of coordination mechanism makes
little diﬀerence. When the discount factor is high, the collusive price is near the joint
proﬁt maximum under either explicit or tacit collusion. Given ﬁrms’ long-run view,
high prices are sustainable and ﬁrms are strongly inclined to lead price increases. It
is when the discount factor is moderate that the coordination mechanism makes the
biggest diﬀerence. Firms are able to sustain high prices but no ﬁrm is willing to act
as a price leader to get price to that level. For the numerical example in Figure 1
with  = 7 the competitive price is .91 and explicit collusion results in a price of 4.47
which is close to the joint proﬁt maximum of 5.00; however, tacit collusion with price
leadership results in a price of only 2.13. It is when ﬁrms are moderately patient that
the means of coordination has the most signiﬁcant impact on the steady-state price.









Figure 1: Price under explicit collusion (solid line) and tacit collusion (dashed line)
40Of course, sustainability is also an issue with tacit collusion. However, since e  ∗ then
incentive compatibility constraints are not binding under tacit collusion (at least when ﬁrms are not
too asymmetric).










Figure 2: Price diﬀerence between explicit and tacit collusion, e  − ∗
This insight may also have implications for when cartel formation (that is, explicit
collusion) is most likely. When the discount factor is suﬃciently low, cartel formation
is unlikely because the rise in price is small (whether ﬁrms, in the absence of cartel
formation, would compete or tacitly collude). When the discount factor is suﬃciently
high, cartel formation is not likely either if the alternative is tacit collusion because
tacit collusion does nearly as well.41 It is when the discount factor is moderate
that cartel formation is most attractive because it results in a much higher price
than if ﬁrms either competed or tacitly colluded. While the attractiveness of tacit
collusion (compared to competition) is always greater when the discount factor is
higher, that is not the case with the attractiveness of explicit collusion (compared
to tacit collusion). What are conditions promoting collusion can then depend on
whether collusion is explicit or tacit.
9 Concluding Remarks
In his classic examination of imperfect competition, Chamberlain (1948) originally
argued that collusion would naturally emerge because each ﬁrm would recognize the
incentive to maintain a collusive price, rather than undercut its rivals’ prices and
bring forth retaliation. We now know that it is a non-trivial matter for ﬁrms to co-
ordinate on a collusive solution because there are so many collusive equilibria. These
equilibria diﬀer in terms of the mechanism that sustains collusion as well as the par-
ticular outcome that is sustained. Modern oligopoly theory has generally ignored the
question of how a collusive arrangement is achieved and instead focused on what can
41This results is at best suggestive because it comes with at least two serious caveats. First, if
more severe punishments can be coordinated upon under explicit collusion then price will be higher.
Second, the comparison focuses on steady-state proﬁt and ignores how the transition path might
diﬀer between tacit and explicit collusion.
24be sustained; that is, the properties of equilibrium outcomes. While the mutual un-
derstanding implicit in equilibrium can be acquired through express communication,
this leaves unaddressed non-explicit forms of collusion, which are accepted by econo-
mists and the courts to occur in practice and are well-documented by experimental
evidence.42 This lack of theoretical attention to the distinction between explicit and
tacit collusion has prevented advances in our understanding of how the means of coor-
dination impacts the form and extent of collusion and, as a consequence, limited the
role of economic theory in deﬁning the contours of what is legal and illegal according
to antitrust law.
The primary contribution of this paper is to characterize what collusive pricing
looks like when ﬁrms deploy tacit means of coordination, speciﬁcally, price leadership.
A model of tacit collusion requires jettisoning the assumption of equilibrium and
instead imposing plausible assumptions on what ﬁrms commonly believe about their
behavior. With mutual understanding about the method of tacit collusion - price
leadership with price increases that are at least matched - but not about who leads
a n da tw h a tp r i c e ,i tp r o v e dp o s s i b l et oc haracterize the steady-state price. If ﬁrms are
not too asymmetric, the steady-state price under tacit collusion is strictly less than the
maximal equilibrium price and, therefore, less than the price that could be achieved
with explicit collusion. While tacit coordination avoids the possibility of legal action,
it produces a lower price than if ﬁrms were to expressly communicate. Thus, if the
threat of penalties due to antitrust enforcement deters ﬁrms from engaging in explicit
collusion, there is a welfare gain even if ﬁrms manage to tacitly collude.
The importance of understanding the distinction between explicit and tacit col-
lusion is especially acute when it comes to policy. If the objective is to detect and
prosecute cartels then explicit collusion is relevant in which case we need theories
of explicit collusion to produce patterns to look for in the data. If the objective is
to prevent horizontal mergers with coordinated eﬀects then tacit collusion is most
relevant in which case we need to know for what market structures tacit collusion
is more likely to occur and lead to signiﬁcant price increases. It is hoped that the
progress that has been made here in developing a theory of tacit collusion will spur
more research on modelling the distinction between explicit and tacit collusion, and
thereby serve to close the gap between theory and practice on the matter of collusion.
42Some recent work showing the emergence of tacit collusion in an experimental setting includes
Fonseca and Normann (2011) - who investigate when express means of coordination are especially
valuable relative to tacit means - and Rojas (2011) - who shows that tacit collusion in the lab can
be quite sophisticated in that the degree of collusion can vary with the current state of demand. For
general references on tacit collusion in experiments, see Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) and
Engel (2007).
2510 Appendix A
For when the price set is ∆ and ∗ ∈ ∆, let us derive suﬃcient conditions for the





⊆ {0 + ∗
} if p− ≤ (00) where 0  ∗ − 
= {∗} if p− =( ∗∗)
⊆ {∗ 0 − } if p− ≥ (00) where 0  ∗ + 
To show that this holds for 0  ∗−,i ti ss u ﬃcient to establish that a lower bound
on (∗ − ∗ − ) is ∗ −  +  when  ∈ {23}. If the unconstrained
optimum is at least ∗ − +  then that is indeed the case.
Deﬁne b () ≡ () as the best reply function when all other ﬁrms price at ,
and b  : <+ → <+ We want to show: if  ∈ {23} then b (∗ − ) ≥ ∗−( − 1)
It will be shown that a suﬃcient condition for this result is b 
0

































Using the functional forms in Section 8, b 
0





























≤ 12, it follows from the previous equality:
b (





























∗ − 2) ≥ b (
∗ − ) −

2
26Using b (∗ − ) ≥ ∗ − 
2, the previous inequality implies:
b (








∗ − 2) ≥ 
∗ − 
w h i c hi st h ed e s i r e dr e s u l tf o rt h ec a s eo f =2 . The proof is completed by induction.
Suppose for  ≥ 2 it is true that:
b (
∗ − ) ≥ 
∗ − ( − 1)
Consider:
b (
∗ − )=b (







∗ − ) ≤ b (




∗ − ( +1 )) ≥ b (
∗ − ) −

2
Using b (∗ − ) ≥ ∗ − ( − 1) in the preceding inequality,
b (
∗ − ( +1 )) ≥ 










which proves the result. The proof when 0  ∗ +  is analogous.
11 Appendix B
A useful property of other ﬁrms using PMP-compatible strategies is that a lower
bound on a rational ﬁrm’s period  continuation payoﬀ is the payoﬀ associated with











in all periods (Lemma 7). Intuitively,
if the rivals to ﬁrm  are using PMP-compatible strategies then they will price at least











in all ensuing periods, as long as ﬁrm  does
not violate the PMP property and induce a shift to . Hence, ﬁrm  can at least












Lemma 7 Let   denote a ﬁrm’s continuation payoﬀ for period  If the other ﬁrms’















∀∀ ≤  − 1





























27Proof of Lemma 7. Wlog, the analysis will be conducted from the perspective












in the current period and then, in all ensuing periods,
matching the maximum price of the other ﬁrms’ in the previous period:

1









































Given this strategy for ﬁrm  and that the other ﬁrms’ strategies are PMP-compatible,









































 ∀ 6=  ∀ ≥ 2 it follows from ﬁrm ’s proﬁt being increasing









































































































































































from which we conclude   ≥ (1
1
)(1 − ).















for some  and some  ≤  − 1
A PMP-compatible strategy has a ﬁrm price at  in the current and all future
periods. Thus, if ﬁrm ’s beliefs over other ﬁrms’ strategies has support in 
then pricing at  is clearly optimal. Hence, a PMP-compatible strategy is uniquely
optimal for ﬁrm  for those histories.













−1. To prove this lemma, we’ll show that, for any strategy for ﬁrm  that does not
satisfy the PMP property, there is a PMP-compatible strategy that yields a strictly
higher payoﬀ. Thus, regardless of ﬁrm ’s beliefs over the other ﬁrms’ strategies (as
long as they have support in ), its expected payoﬀ is strictly higher with some













∀∀ ≤  − 1, ﬁrm ’s strategy can








us begin by considering a PMP-incompatible strategy that has ﬁrm  price at 0  e .
When its rivals price at p
− a PMP-compatible strategy that has ﬁrm  price at e  is
























(e  e ) (11)





















≤ (e  e )  e . By the strict





 e  0,( 1 2 )i st r u e .



















































































and the RHS is the payoﬀ from pricing at 00. In examining the LHS, note that
43Actually, it is shown to be only weakly as proﬁtable when p
− =( e  e )
29



























































































































































.44 Thus, (13) holds for (14).
To complete the proof, it will be shown that the LHS of (13) is increasing in p
−






















The derivative with respect to 


















































(16) exceeds (17) because the second term in (16) is non-negative, given that p
− ≤ ¡
¢












44Recall that e  is the highest price consistent with the grim trigger strategy being an equilibrium.







= e  and 00 = (e  e ) and otherwise
is a strict inequality.
30Proof of Theorem 2. Given ﬁrms’ strategies are PMP-compatible then it im-





that each ﬁrm’s price is weakly
increasing. Given a ﬁnite price set and the boundedness and monotonicity of prices,




and ﬁnite  such
that 
1 = ···= 
 = b  for all  ≥ .
The remainder of the proof entails proving b  ≤ ∗ + .I f∗ +  ≥ e  then, given
that PMP-compatible strategies do not have ﬁrms pricing above e , it is immediate
that b  ≤ ∗ +  Thus, suppose ∗ + e . Before going any further, an overview
of the proof is provided. First it is shown that if a ﬁrm is rational and believes
the other ﬁrms use PMP-compatible strategies then a ﬁrm will not price at e .T h e
reason is that ﬁrm  would ﬁnd it optimal to price above ∗ +  only if it induced at
least one of its rivals to enact further price increases (and not just match the ﬁrm’s
price). However, if a ﬁrm believes its rivals will not price above e  (which follows from
believing its rivals use PMP-compatible strategies) then it is not optimal for a ﬁrm to
raise price to e  because it can only expect its rivals to match a price of e  not exceed
it. This argument works as well to show that each of the other ﬁrms will not raise
price to e  Hence, there is an upper bound on price of e  − . The proof is completed
by induction using the common knowledge in A1-A2. If a ﬁrm believes its rivals will
not price above 0 then it can be shown that a ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal not to price
above 0 − . This argument works only when 0 ≥ ∗ +2  which implies that an
upper bound on price is ∗ + , which is the desired result.
Deﬁne 

(p−) to be the maximal element of (p−) and let us show that 

(p−)
is non-decreasing in p−. By the deﬁnition of 




















 0 ∀ ∈  ≡
n























































 ∀ ∈ 

























































 0 ∀ ∈ 
which, along with p00
− ≤ p0











.H e n c e ,

(p−) is non-decreasing.
31By (4), 0  ∗+ implies 

(00) ≤ 0−.G i v e n

(p−) is non-decreasing
in p−,i tf o l l o w s :




∗ +  then 

(p−) ≤ 
0 −  (18)























This property will be used in the ensuing proof.
Let us show that if ﬁrm  believes the other ﬁrms’ strategies are PMP-compatible
then a price of e  −  is strictly preferred to e .F i r m’s beliefs on p




















¤−1  Lemma 7
implies that a lower bound on its payoﬀ from 
 = e  −  is

¡





















¤−1  it follows from all ﬁrms using PMP-
compatible strategies that ﬁrm ’s payoﬀ from 












(e  e ) (21)





≤ e  −  for all p
− ≤ (e  e ) by (18). It then











¤−1  ap r i c eo fe  −  is strictly preferred to e .
It follows that if a ﬁrm is rational and believes the other ﬁrms use PMP-compatible
strategies then its optimal price does not exceed e  − .
Given the common knowledge from Assumptions A1-A2, it is also the case that
ﬁrm  believes ﬁrm  (6= ) is rational and that ﬁrm  believes ﬁrm  (for all  6= ) uses
a PMP-compatible strategy. Hence, applying the preceding argument to ﬁrm , ﬁrm
 believes ﬁrm  will not price above e −.F i r m’s beliefs on p









 e  − 





≤ e  − 2
for all p
− ≤ (e  −  e  − ).45 By the same logic as above, a lower bound on ﬁrm
’s payoﬀ from 
 = e  − 2 is

¡









(e  − 2 e  − 2) (22)
45If instead e − ≤ ∗ + then, given that it has already been shown e − is an upper bound on
the limit price, it follows that ∗ +  is an upper bound and we’re done.
32while its payoﬀ from 
 = e  −  is

¡









(e  −  e  − ) (23)
W i t h( 2 3 ) ,w eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tﬁrms will not price above e − w h i c hw a sd e r i v e di n
the ﬁrst step. Again using (19), it is concluded that (22) strictly exceeds (23). There-










 e  − 
¤−1 
ap r i c eo fe −2 is strictly preferred to e −. It follows that if a ﬁrm is rational and a
ﬁrm believes other ﬁrms’ strategies are PMP-compatible, believes the other ﬁrms are
rational, and believes each of the other ﬁrms believes its rivals use PMP-compatible
strategies then a ﬁrm’s optimal price does not exceed e  − 2. Hence, all ﬁrms will
not price above e  − 2.
The proof is completed by induction. Suppose we have shown that ﬁrm  believes










 0¤−1  ( T h a tw ec a ng e tt ot h ep o i n tt h a tﬁr m sh a v et h o s e
beliefs relies on rationality and that ﬁrms use PMP-compatible strategies are both





≤ 0 − for all p
− ≤ (00) A
lower bound on ﬁrm ’s payoﬀ from 















0 − ) (24)
while its payoﬀ from 
















since all ﬁrms have an upper bound of 0 on their prices. Using (19), it is concluded











 0¤−1  ap r i c eo f0 −  is strictly preferred to 0.I t
follows that ﬁrms’ prices are bounded above by 0 − . The preceding argument is
correct as long as 0  ∗ + ; therefore, price is bounded above by ∗ + .

































33which implies ∗   by the strict concavity of  in own price. To show ∗  ,
note that () () and () ≥  ∀ ≤  implies () 









and we are done. From hereon, suppose e   in
which case the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) binds:
(e  e )
1 − 














implies () ≤ () then, by the strict concavity of
,
 () (())













 Next note () ≤ ∗   implies





























is sustainable with the grim trigger strategy. Given (26) -
where the ICC binds for  = e  - and evaluating (28) at  = ∗ -s ot h eI C Cd o e sn o t
bind - it follows from (2) that e  ∗
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . Given that b  ≤ ∗ +  by Theorem 2, it is only necessary
to show b  ≥ ∗ −  Thus, suppose b  ∗ −  - that is, we are considering strategies
consistent with A1-A2 for which there exists 0 such that 
 = b  ∀∀ ≥ 0 -a n dl e t
us derive a contradiction.
By A3, this means ∃ such that, for  0 +  a ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ from
using a strategy that converges to b  is
(b  b )
1 − 
 (29)
By Lemma 7, a lower bound on ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ from pricing instead at (b  b ) is





((b  b )(b  b )) (30)
It follows from b  ∗ −  that (30) strictly exceeds (29) and, therefore, this ﬁrm’s
strategy is not rational given its beliefs as to other ﬁrms’ strategies. Hence, it must
34b et h ec a s et h a tb  ≥ ∗ −  which, when combined with Theorem 2, implies b  ∈
{∗ − ∗ ∗ + }.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 . Given that
∗
  0 and
 
 =0for 










e  − 
∗ =
42 + 2 +4 3 + 2 − 42 − 2 − 4 +4  +3 2 − 42
62 − 122 + 3 +8 3 − 3 − 22
−
 +(  − )
2 − (1 + )




( −  + )
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As the term in [] in (31) is positive then

½









4 =1 6 
3 ( − )+
3 (4 − )  0
Ψ(1) = 16
4 − 48
3 +4 8 
2
2 − 16










2 ( − ) − 2( − )+
2 ( − )
¢
=1 6 ( − )
¡

2 − 2 + 
2¢
=1 6 ( − )( − )
2  0
which follow from 0.G i v e n Ψ(0)Ψ(1)  0,i fΨ() is weakly monotonic
then Ψ()  0∀ ∈ [01] and thus Ψ()  0∀ ∈ [0
∗) Let us show Ψ0 ()  0.
Consider:
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2 − 4 − 
2¢
 0
Ψ0 (1)  0 is a suﬃcient condition to establish that Ψ0 ()  0∀ ∈ [01]. Given that
Ψ









= −8( − )(4 − 3)  0
we are done.
3512 Appendix C
In deriving suﬃcient conditions for
¡
¢
to be a subgame perfect equilibrium,
let us ﬁrst consider  have  denote the lagged maximum price. If  =  then
 ¡
¢










































































































































































































































If  ' 1 then (37) and (38) hold. Finally, if  =  then ¡
¢


































36which holds if  ' 1 In sum,  is subgame perfect if  ' 1 and (36) holds.
Next, let us turn to  If  =  then  ¡
¢
=  is optimal iﬀ  is at least

















































































Both conditions hold for all .46 If  = 0 then  (0)=0 is optimal iﬀ 0 is at least



























































(42) holds for  ' 1, and (43) holds for all  Finally, if  =  then  ¡
¢
= 
is optimal iﬀ (39) is true. In sum,  is subgame perfect if  ' 1





































































Assuming linear demand and constant marginal cost,
(p−)=
Ã












 (0 0) for if that was not the case then 0 would be a static Nash
equilibrium and thereby violation the assumption that  is the unique Nash equilibrium. Similarly,

















































which, after some manipulations, is equivalent to
3
 + 
  2 +2  +2 
 +2 








 +(  − )
2( − )
and again performing some manipulations, (45) is equivalent to
[ +(  − )]
£
(6 − 4)( − )+
2¤
+2(  − 2)( − )  0 (46)
The ﬁrst term is positive because  , while the second term is non-negative when
 ≥ 2. Hence, if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated then (46) is true. When
instead 2 then (46) holds when  ' 0. Hence, if cost is suﬃciently small then
(46) is true.
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